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Global climate change has important implications for the way in which 
benefits and burdens will be distributed amongst present and future 
generations. As a result it raises important questions of intergenerational 
justice. It is shown that there is at least one serious problem for those who 
wish to approach these questions by utilising familiar principles of justice. 
This is that such theories often pre-suppose harm-based accounts of injustice 
which are incompatible with the fact that the very social policies which 
climatologists and scientists claim will reduce the risks of climate change will 
also predictably, if indirectly, determine which individuals will live in the 
future. One proposed solution to this problem is outlined grounded in terms of 
the notion of collective interests. 
 
  
The issue of global climate change has attracted increasing interest amongst political 
scientists and theorists in recent years. The complex interactions amongst nation-states 
which have resulted from moves to construct world-wide, and legally binding, restrictions 
on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a fascinating source of research for international 
relations theorists generally, and game theorists in particular.1
                                                          
*  I would like to thank Andrew Williams, John Horton, and an anonymous referee of Political Studies for 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 
 Moreover, the fact that the 
future costs of climate change are not expected to be shared evenly amongst nations has 
1 For a game theoretical account of climate change politics, see Hugh Ward, ‘Game Theory and the Politics 
of Global Warming: the State of Play and Beyond’, Political Studies, 44, 5 (1996), 850-71; for the 
international relations perspective on climate change issues see M. Peterson, Global Warming and Global 
Politics, (London, Routledge, 1996). 
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attracted the interest of theorists concerned with problems of global justice.2
 Recent evidence suggests, for example, that present levels of GHG emissions will 
have particularly grave consequences both for the integrity of the biosphere and for the 
well-being of its future human and non-human inhabitants. In its most recent assessment of 
the global climate change issue, the authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) concluded not only that ‘the balance of evidence suggests discernible 
human influence on climate change’,
 However, one 
of the most striking set of questions raised by climate change concerns the way in which 
social, economic and cultural resources should be distributed across generations. 
3 but also that the long-term impact of climate change 
will have a predominantly, if not uniformly, adverse impact on the health, cultural life, and 
economic prosperity of future human populations.4  In fact, the IPCC went on to conclude 
that global climate change issues raise ‘particular questions of equity between 
generations.’5
 While the IPCC seem to take it largely for granted that climate change raises 
questions of intergenerational justice, there have been few systematic attempts to test the 
robustness of these assumptions (1) across different theories of distributive justice and (2) 
in the light of some perplexing problems associated with extending the scope of these 
theories beyond the realm of dealings between contemporaries of the same society. 
 
                                                          
2 See M. Grubb, ‘Seeking fair weather: ethics and the international debate on climate change’, International 
Affairs, 71, 3 (1995), 463-96; H. Shue, ‘Avoidable necessity: Global warming, international fairness, and 
alternative energy’, in I. Shapiro and J. W. DeCew, eds., NOMOS XXXVII: Theory and Practice, (New 
York, New York University Press, 1995), 239-64; and H. Shue, ‘The Unavoidability of Justice’, in A. 
Hurrell and B. Kingsbury, eds., The International Politics of the Environment, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1992), pp.373-97. 
3 J.T. Houghton, M.C. Zinyowera, and R.H. Moss, eds., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate 
Change, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 1996, p.5. 
4 See A.J. McMichael et al, ‘Human Population Health’, in R.T. Watson, eds., Climate Change 1995: 
Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. 564ff. It is worth noting that at least some of the IPCC’s research findings are controversial. However, 
even those who are sceptical of the relevance of the IPCC’s findings for questions of social justice, such as 
Wilfrid Beckerman, do not dispute the fact that climate change will impact upon the distribution of resources 
across generations to some extent. See W. Beckerman, Small is Stupid: Blowing the whistle on the greens, 
(London, Duckworth, 1995), pp.90ff. 
5 K.J. Arrow et al, ‘Intertemporal Equity, Discounting and Economic Efficiency’, in J.P Bruce, H. Lee, and 
E. Haites, eds., Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 130. This conclusion is consistent with the text of the earlier United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, according to which those nations party to it ‘should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.’ 
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (London, HMSO Books, 1993), p.5. 
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Regarding issue 2, for example, there appears to be a widely held conviction that activities 
which compound the climate change problem are unjust, or unethical, because they harm 
generations yet unborn.6
 In the next section, I outline briefly a prominent example of an identity-dependent  
theory of intergenerational justice. Next, I explain how this theory, by virtue of its identity-
dependent structure, seems unlikely to generate stringent duties of intergenerational justice 
- for example, duties which could explain why existing generations should sacrifice certain 
benefits in order to preserve the climate system for their remote descendants. Next, I argue 
that whereas we might appeal to an identity-independent theory of intergenerational justice 
in order to explain the basis of such duties, there are considerations which suggest that it 
would be worth seeing if some version of the identity-dependent view can be defended. 
Finally, I develop one line of thought which seeks to do precisely this, which is developed 
in terms of the notion of collective interests.  
 This paper argues, however, that a unique philosophical puzzle 
confronts those who wish to explain our responsibilities to future generations, for example 
regarding the climate change problem, in terms of the language of disadvantages and 
harms. The central problem developed is that it is unclear how exactly future persons can 
be harmed, or disadvantaged, by acts or social policies which are necessary conditions of 
their coming into existence. This presents a serious challenge, it will be argued, for a whole 
range of accounts of environmental, and intergenerational, justice which assume that 
actions or policies can only be wrong if they harm, disadvantage or victimise particular 
human or non-human animals (I call these identity-dependent accounts of justice). 
 
Intergenerational justice as resource conservation 
One theory of intergenerational justice which seems consistent with the thought that 
existing generations owe it to their distant successors not to despoil the natural 
environment in general, and the climate system in particular, proposes that each generation 
should hand down to the next a no less abundant share of resources than that which it 
inherited from previous generations. According to an influential version of this theory 
proposed by Barry, the consumption of non-renewable natural resources over time ‘should 
                                                          
6 Onora O’Neill, for example, writes that ‘by burning fossil fuels prodigally we accelerate the green-house 
effect and may dramatically harm successors, who can do nothing to us.’ See O’Neill, Towards Justice and 
Virtue (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.115.  
  
4 
be compensated for in the sense that later generations should be left no worse off. . . than 
they would have been without the depletion.’7
 Barry comes to this resourcist view by the following line of thought.
 We might call this the resourcist view of 
intergenerational justice. 
8
 It would be unfair to require existing generations to leave all non-renewable 
resources untouched for the sake of future generations (that is to consume nothing); 
neither would it be possible for each generation to replicate in every detail the non-
renewable resources it exhausts. However, it would appear to be a sound principle to aim 
for that existing generations ought not act so as to worsen the position of future 
generations by depleting non-renewable resources with no compensatory action or 
recompense. 
 The 
fundamental issue for a theory of intergenerational justice, he thinks, is the appropriate 
consumption of non-renewable natural resources across time. When reserves of non-
renewable resources (such as oil or natural gas) are depleted, the costs of extracting and 
then using these resources to generate electricity to heat homes, power cars, and run 
machinery are increased for future generations. There are also costs imposed upon these 
generations in virtue of the side-effects of depleting these resources, such as global climate 
change, air pollution and destruction of the ozone layer. As a consequence, it is crucial to 
establish how much existing generations may deplete stocks of non-renewable resources 
without violating the requirements of intergenerational justice.  
 The idea of making recompense, however, typically leaves it open for a given 
compensation for a depleted resource, X, to be compensated by the provision of a given 
commensurable resource, Y - so long as this compensation enables the recipient to be no 
worse off than they would have been had the original resource, X, not been used up. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of such compensation in the intergenerational context 
would be the way in which improvements in technology (energy efficiency, for example) 
appear to compensate for losses of natural non-renewable resources (energy resources 
such as coal, for example).  
 So long as we regard the climate system as a sort of ‘open access resource’ in its 
own right, it appears that resourcism will generate extensive obligations on the part of 
                                                          
7 B. Barry, ‘The Ethics of Resource Depletion’, in Democracy, Power and Justice, (Oxford, Clarendon, 
1989), p.519 - emphasis added. 
8 Barry, ‘The ethics of resource depletion’, pp.515ff.  
  
5 
existing generations (1) not to damage the climate system by continued profligate GHG 
emissions, (2) not to deplete non-renewable natural resources which are sources of GHGs, 
or (3) not to bring about the destruction of certain natural resources (such as coastal land) 
through climate change unless these actions are offset by an appropriate amount of 
compensation.  
 
Intergenerational resourcism and the non-identity problem 
As a test for Barry’s theory of intergenerational justice, next consider the case of the Two 
Climate Change Policies: 
 
A choice must be made between two mutually exclusive, and exhaustive, climate 
change policies. The first, the Depletion Policy, involves a continuing 
commitment to non-renewable energy sources and associated high levels of GHG 
emissions with no commitment to any offsetting compensation measures for the 
sake of future generations. The second, the Conservation Policy, involves a move 
towards heavier reliance on renewable energy sources, tight restrictions on GHG 
emissions, as well as certain compensatory measures for the sake of future 
generations (such as increased investment in schemes to protect coastal areas 
which are vulnerable to climate change induced sea-level rises).  
 Adopting the Conservation policy, it is known, will limit the damage caused 
by climate change. The Depletion Policy, though, would demand little or no 
sacrifice of present persons, and, because it would not check the increase of 
human originating GHG emissions, would have, relative to the Conservation 
Policy, more serious repercussions on human well-being (as associated with the 
social costs of adapting to higher temperatures and sea-levels, for example).  
 In fact, it is known with some confidence that, after one or two centuries after 
the choice has been made, many of the people who would later live if the 
Depletion Policy is chosen will enjoy a significantly lower quality of life than 
those who would live if the Conservation Policy is adopted. However, the long-
term disadvantages associated with choosing Depletion are not so severe that the 
persons who will come into existence if this option is chosen will lead lives 
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which are not worth living - i.e. they will not on balance regret that these people 
had ever been born. 
  
 Next, consider the following line of argument which seems to undermine the 
reasoning behind many people’s intuitive objections to the Depletion Policy.9
 As a consequence of the profound impact it will have on even the smallest details 
of all people’s lives, whatever decision is made in regard to the Conservation and 
Depletion policies will predictably, if indirectly, affect who mates with whom and when, 
and thus which individuals will be born in the future. This is because all persons owe their 
existence to the coming together of a singular egg and a singular sperm - and this ‘coming 
together’ is highly sensitive to antecedent events. In fact, after a few generations, and 
depending on which policy we choose, completely different sets of people will come into 
existence and these sets of people will owe their existence to this prior choice (they would 
not have been born if this choice had not been made). Moreover, as we can predict with 
some accuracy that the adoption of neither policy will result in any of our distant 
successors leading lives which are not worth living, it appears that choosing Depletion 
over Conservation will not result in any particular future person being harmed. On the 
other hand, such a choice would benefit many in the present generation by doing so, as 
even the limited sacrifices which Conservation will demand of existing persons will be on 
balance harmful. It seems then that the policy that ought to be adopted is, perhaps counter-
intuitively, the Depletion Policy. 
 
 Is there an objection to this line of argument and, if so, what is it? The need to 
answer these questions gives rise to what has been called the non-identity problem10
                                                          
9 Various versions of this argument have been put forward, but by far the most influential is Parfit’s. See D. 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.351ff. 
 and 
the way in which we answer them will have great significance for the way in which we 
approach issues of environmental, and intergenerational, justice. Take Barry’s resourcist 
view. The non-identity problem appears to pose a severe challenge for this view because it 
appeals to a strong connection between the requirements of justice on the one side, and the 
notions of harm and disadvantage on the other. Barry holds that failures to compensate 
future generations for deficits in the resource base they enjoy which are brought about by 
10 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p.359. 
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the actions of previous generations are unjust, and that they are unjust because such 
actions render people worse off than they otherwise would have been. But the non-identity 
problem demonstrates that there will be few, if any, cases where a future person will be 
rendered worse off by their ancestors’ profligate emissions of GHGs, because these people 
would never have existed had these profligate actions not been performed. 
 This is not a problem which Barry’s view faces alone. All views of 
intergenerational justice which endorse what has become known as the ‘contractualist’ 
view of morality will be prone to the non-identity problem. According to contractualism, 
the source of moral motivation is ‘the desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on 
grounds they could not reasonably reject’11 and an act is wrong only if its performance 
‘would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which 
no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.’12 For 
a person to reasonably reject (or raise a decisive objection to) an act or social policy on the 
contractualist view, this person must (1) be disadvantaged or harmed by it in some way 
and (2) they must have a complaint grounded in this disadvantage which is unanswerable 
(we might call this the Unanswerable Complaints Requirement).13
 The problem with applying the unanswerable complaints requirement to the 
Conservation-Depletion choice, though, is that there appear to be no particular people 
here whom our acts will affect for the worse, and will thus have a complaint against us, if 
we choose Depletion. Moreover, as even mildly conservationist policies will require some 
sacrifices of existing persons, it seems that if any people have unanswerable complaints 
here it will be people who belong to the present generation (for example, those living in 
  
                                                          
11 T.M. Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and 
Beyond, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 116. 
12 T.M. Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, p.110. Barry endorses the contractualist view in both 
Theories of Justice, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp. 284ff; and Justice as Impartiality, 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 67-72. It is worth noting that Barry does not address the difficulties which 
the non-identity problem pose for his view in any of his published work on intergenerational and 
environmental justice, although in a recent article he does observe that contractual thinking cannot readily 
explain our duties to future persons or the non-human world. Thus he remarks that although ‘the interests of 
people in the future should have no less weight than those of people in the present’, it does not appear that 
‘the contractual apparatus is useful in this context; it throws up more problems than it solves.’ See 
‘Contractual Justice: a Modest Defence’, Utilitas, 8 (1996), p.365. Barry does not go on to state how he 
thinks we might reconcile contractualism with stringent duties of intergenerational justice, though it appears 
to be his desire to do so in the last of his three volume work  A Treatise on Social Justice. 
13 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, who observes that on the Scanlonian view ‘an act cannot be wrong 
unless it will affect someone in a way that cannot be justified - unless there will be some complainant whose 
complaint cannot be answered’ (p.523).  
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the developing world who will suffer if their economies fail to keep growing) - and these 
complaints will be raised against the adoption of the Conservation Policy, not the 
Depletion Policy).14
 I have focused, here, on the questions raised by the non-identity problem for 
theories of intergenerational justice, such as Barry’s, which explicitly endorse the 
contractualist view. However, similar questions will be raised for numerous other theories 
which appeal, at least in part, to the way in which acts or social policies harm particular 
persons when they are extended to deal with questions of intergenerational justice. It 
would appear to call into doubt, for example, recent attempts to use Locke’s well-known 
second proviso - according to which acquisitions of natural resources must leave ‘enough, 
and as good left in common for others’ - to ground stringent requirements of 
environmental conservation.
 
15
 Theories such as these, which can be described as identity-dependent theories, 
direct us to make particular human beings, or animals, healthier or happier or rescue 
people from harm or disadvantage, particularly if these disadvantages arise through no 
fault of their own. Identity-dependent theories can be contrasted with identity-independent 
theories, according to which it can be wrong to perform acts or adopt social policies, even 
if they do not harm any particular persons. Such theories direct us to promote health or 
happiness, and to eliminate poverty or disease from an impersonal point of view (that is 
for reasons quite apart from the way in which particular individuals are affected by these 
phenomena). 
 
 One way of illustrating the dilemma that the non-identity problem poses for 
identity-dependent theories of environmental and intergenerational justice, is to note that it 
tempts the proponents of these theories into holding four, mutually inconsistent, beliefs. 
According to these beliefs:  
                                                          
14 The possibility that climate change policies could well have as damaging an effect on the well-being of the 
present poor as they do beneficial effects for the well-being of future generations is raised by Beckerman and 
Malkin. The authors observe that ‘Global warming is far more glamorous and telegenic, of course, than the 
need for better toilets and drains in the Third World. But if we truly care about the welfare of our fellow 
world citizens, it is these kinds of environmental issues upon which we must focus our attention.’ See W. 
Beckerman and J. Malkin, ‘How much does global warming matter?’, The Public Interest, 114 (1994), 
pp.15-16. 
15 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (London, Everyman, 1924), Book II, Ch.V, Sec. 27, p.130. See 
also R. Elliot, ‘Future Generations, Locke’s Proviso and Libertarian Justice’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
3 (1986), pp.217ff. 
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(A) adopting the Depletion Policy is wrong.  
(B) an act or social policy can be wrong only if it harms or disadvantages 
a particular person  
(C) an act or social policy harms or disadvantages a particular person 
only if it makes them worse off than they would have been had the act 
not been performed   
(D) the adoption of the Depletion Policy is a remote, but necessary, 
condition of the Depletion People coming into existence.  
 If we are inclined towards an identity-dependent view, it seems that we must 
abandon either belief B or C (or possibly both) if we are to construct an account which 
explains why choosing the Depletion Policy in the above case would violate some 
requirement of justice.16 However, both B and C appear to have a great deal of intuitive 
appeal. David Heyd, for example, has argued recently for the view that the price of 
abandoning either of these beliefs, and with them the identity-dependent view of justice, is 
simply too high.17 Endorsing a view which he calls generocentrism, Heyd claims that 
obligations of social justice only can be owed to persons whose identities lie beyond the 
reach of the non-identity problem. But because persons whose identities do not depend on 
present decisions will almost invariably belong to the present generation, Heyd claims that 
we have no obligations of justice to the vast majority of future individuals. If this rigidly 
identity-dependent view could be defended, it would appear that the non-identity problem 
has massive implications for both the nature of intergenerational and environmental 
justice. It implies, for example, that depletionist acts or social policies which result in the 
emission of huge amounts of GHGs into the atmosphere, and a lowering of the quality of 
life of future generations, are neither unjust nor immoral.18
The limits of the non-identity problem 
  
                                                          
16 I put aside the possibility of revising belief D in order to retain beliefs A, B and C - a move which seems 
at the very least inconsistent with the pre-eminent theories of personal identity. See Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons, pp.351-55. 
17 Heyd, Genethics: Moral issues in the creation of persons, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 
80ff. 
18 It is worth noting that the non-identity problem appears to call into question the idea of obligations to both 
future humans and non-humans. This is because the identity of particular non-human animals will be as 
contingent on events which pre-date their existence as their future human counterparts.  
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Even if we suppose that the non-identity problem is of relevance for debates about our 
obligations to future generations, and the issue of environmental justice in more general 
terms, it does appear that considerations of non-identity are not problematic for all theories 
of environmental concern. One way of explaining why this is the case is to see how the 
problem relates to different ways of theorising about the environment.  
 In what has become the standard taxonomy of such theorising, we might 
distinguish between anthropocentric, zoocentric, and ecocentric modes of environmental 
thought.19 Anthropocentric theories are those which attribute value only to states of human 
beings. One prominent example is the ‘green theory of value’ proposed by Robert Goodin. 
According to this view, the value of the natural world can be traced only ‘to its value to 
human beings and the place it occupies in their lives.’20
 Zoocentric theories, by contrast, attribute value only to states of sentient creatures, 
including human beings. The idea here is that the desire to restrict the concerns of 
environmental justice to the well-being of human beings represents a sort of ‘human 
chauvinism’
 
21 which ignores the fact that species membership is essentially ‘a morally 
irrelevant difference between individuals.’22 According to Singer, for example, if we are 
committed to the fundamental principle that each human being’s interests must be treated 
with equal concern and respect, we are also committed to accepting this principle of 
equality ‘as a sound moral basis for relations with those outside our own species [such as] 
non-human animals.’23
 Finally, ecocentric theories reject the idea that the natural environment is only 
valuable to the extent that it provides a context for the flourishing of humans or other 
sentient creatures. In contrast, this mode of thought presupposes that components of the 
  
                                                          
19 See, for example, Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp.20ff. 
20 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, (Cambridge, Polity, 1992), pp.42-3. A similarly anthropocentric stance 
on the value of the natural environment is endorsed by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development’s influential report Our Common Future, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987). In the 
foreword to this report, Gro Harlem Brundlandt argues that human well-being ‘is the ultimate goal of all 
environment and development and development policies’ (p.xiv). 
21 See R. and V. Routley, ‘Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism’, in Robert  Elliot, ed., 
Environmental Ethics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.104ff. 
22 Elliot, Environmental  Ethics, p.9. 
23 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.55.  
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natural world such as plant life, and possibly the biotic community as a whole, possess 
value independently of humans or animals.24
 I do not think it is necessary to take a stand on which of these modes of theorising 
best captures our concerns about the environment, or indeed intergenerational justice, in 
order to realise that the non-identity problem only calls into question the scope of certain 
varieties of anthropocentric and zoocentric (and possibly ecocentric) theorising, namely, 
those which appeal to ethical categories that make essential reference to how things are for 
particular individual humans, other sentient creatures, or particular natural objects. In 
short, the distinction between identity-dependent and identity-independent theories of 
justice cuts across the distinction between different ways of theorising about 
environmental concerns and values (of which the anthropocentric, zoocentric, and 
ecocentric views are the most widely discussed). 
  
  Nevertheless, there are at least three considerations which support the view that 
the non-identity problem is at least worthy of more attention than most environmental 
political philosophers have given it in recent years. First, even if we reject the view that 
identity-dependent theorising captures the whole of the story of intergenerational or 
environmental justice, it seems likely that it at least plays some part in this story. As a 
result it seems worth exploring the limits of such theorising.  
 Second, environmental theories which makes no reference to how things are for 
particular individual entities, such as impersonal utilitarianism or biotic holism, are highly 
contentious to say the least. Parfit, for example, has done much to demonstrate that 
applying identity-independent utilitarian principles to questions of intergenerational 
distribution leads to paradoxical results.25 Moreover, the idea behind biotic holism, that 
ethical standing be extended to components of the biosphere (such as rocks, trees, species 
of plant or animal life)  - or even the biosphere as a whole - seems wildly counter-intuitive 
to many.26
                                                          
24 See P. Taylor, Respect for Nature, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986); K. Goodpaster, ‘On 
being morally considerable’, Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1978), pp.308ff. 
  
25 One problem which Parfit raises is that, in line with the duty to maximise social utility across generations, 
utilitarianism could require us to adopt environmental policies which lead to a huge number of people 
existing in the future who lead lives of poor overall quality instead of policies which lead to a much small 
number of people existing in the future who lead lives of a much higher quality. See Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons, pp.381ff. 
26 For criticism of the ecocentric view, see A. Brennan, ‘Ecological Theory and Value in Nature’, in R. 
Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics, pp.195ff. 
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 Third, as noted earlier, much theorising about the environment and 
intergenerational justice remains stubbornly tied both to considerations of harm and 
vinctimhood on the one side, and the interests, needs, rights, and desires of particular 
sentient creatures on the other. This is revealed in the brief discussion of Barry’s and 
Scanlon’s views above, but an additional example of note arises from the work of Shue 
which specifically addresses the issue of climate change. Shue has claimed recently, for 
example, that we should conceive of the harmful effects of climate change as analogous to 
those of passive smoking, the idea being that both the activity of smokers, and of 
profligate emitters of GHGs, render other non-smokers and non-emitters worse off through 
no fault of their own.27
Obligations to future collectivities 
 Shue, however, fails to acknowledge that the fact that future 
persons owe their very existence to the profligate actions of previous generations in these 
cases means that they cannot apparently complain that they have been harmed, or rendered 
worse off, by them. In this respect, the analogy between the effects of passive smoking on 
the one side, and the effects of depletionist policies on future generations on the other, 
seems unsound.  
In this section of the paper I propose that a limited appeal to the interests, rights, or moral 
value, of certain human (or possibly non-human animal) collectivities can solve the non-
identity problem in a limited, though important, range of cases; and as a result this appeal 
can explain, from an identity-dependent point of view, what is wrong with implementing 
policies which will have adverse long-term effects. I call views of intergenerational justice 
grounded in this appeal to human communities group-centred views. Group-centred views 
are special instances of identity-dependent views, such as Barry’s or Scanlon’s, which 
have been extended to include human (or animal) groups as being the subjects of moral 
consideration. these different views relate to each other is explored in figure 1 (page 14) 
 
Climate change and the claims of future collectivities 
The climate changes predicted by the IPCC and other researchers are expected to alter the 
cultural and social fabric of certain nations. There is possibly no better example of this 
                                                          
27 Shue, ‘Avoidable necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and Alternative Energy’, pp.245-6. 
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than the way in which these changes are expected to cause significant sea-level rises in the 
coming decades and centuries. In its latest assessment, the IPCC concluded that there will 
be an increase in global mean sea-levels of between 20cm and 86cm (with a ‘best 
estimate’ of 49cm) on 1990 levels by the year 2100.28 Moreover, it also predicts that this 
will have serious consequences for many nations in the future, but in particular for 
developing countries which are entirely, or have regions which are, low-lying. For 
example, these sea-level rises are expected to damage coastal cropland, and displace 
millions of persons from low-lying and coastal communities. Just some of the low-lying 
nations that the IPCC thinks are in most danger are the north-east coastal nations of Latin 
America, Bangladesh, Egypt and Holland.29
                                                          
28 See R.A. Warrick et al, ‘Changes in Sea-level’, in J. Houghton et al, eds., Climate Change 1995: The 
Science of Climate Change,  p.385.   
    
29 See L. Bijlsma et al, ‘Coastal Zones and Small Islands’, in R.T. Watson et al, eds., Climate Change 1995: 
Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change, 289-324. The authors project that sea-level rise 
will have ‘negative effects on a number of sectors, including tourism, freshwater supply and quality, 
fisheries and aquaculture, agriculture, human settlements, financial services, and human health’ (p.292). 
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(Q1) Can an act be wrong if it does 
not affect any particular value bearing 
individual for the worse?
No
The Identity-Dependent View
Yes
The Identity-Independent View
The Narrow Identity-Dependent 
(or Individualistic) View
(Q2) Can an act be wrong if it affects a particular human 
or animal community (rather than any particular human or 
non-human animal) for the worse?
No Yes
The Wide Identity-Dependent
(or Group-Centred) View 
Figure 1: Identity-Dependent and Identity-Independent Theories
Perhaps the most disconcerting examples of nations vulnerable to sea-level rises, however, 
are the small island states of the South Pacific. The IPCC singles out these nations for 
special attention because of the especially, if not uniformly, adverse effects of sea-level 
rises on these states, including, in the worst case scenario, the possibility of complete 
disappearance. The combined effect of warming and sea-level rises on such states is 
expected to result in reduced soil fertility, reduced availability of agricultural land, and 
higher levels of soil erosion. It will be massively expensive to undertake even moderate 
adaptive responses for all of these effects, and even if the resources could be found (from 
international humanitarian assistance, for example) the costs to various communities in 
terms of maintaining access to traditional ways of life, and adapting to new ways of living, 
would be huge. These are all projections which the IPCC make with some confidence.30
                                                          
30 See Bijlsma et al, ‘Coastal Zones and Small Islands’, pp. 296-98. See also E. Charles et al, A Future for 
Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, pp.67ff. 
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 Suppose the IPCC’s fears about the ‘best estimate’ figure of global sea-level rise of 
a half a meter by the year 2100 are proved accurate. Consider the case of  
 
The Displaced Islanders. Towards the end of the 21st century, the elders of 
a Pacific island state have assembled to assess the damage which climate 
change has caused their small community. In line with the IPCC’s 
projections, their island has been partially submerged by the Pacific Ocean, 
and their agricultural industry partially destroyed by a combination of soil 
erosion and soil infertility. Because of the lack of employment prospects 
and general social upheaval, moreover, the indigenous population has been 
cut to a small percentage of its twentieth century level. Finally, because of 
the combined impact of population displacement and other impacts, many 
cultural practices - practices which had been handed down through the 
generations -  have been abandoned. The community, the elders agreed, 
was on the verge of collapse.   
 
  Let us put aside the economic, social and health impacts of climate change on 
existing islanders, and in particular the important issues of international justice which this 
case raises. Has the island community itself been harmed by - can a complaint be made on 
its behalf against - the failure of previous generations to implement GHG limiting policies 
which may have prevented the unsavoury effects of climate change imagined above? 
According to the group-centred view, there is at least some basis to say that it has. The 
idea is that, despite the fact that no particular islander who exists in the future where 
depletionist policies had been adopted would also have existed had conservationist 
policies been adopted, various island groups and associations would exist whichever sort 
of policy had been chosen, and the interests of these groups are deserving of concern and 
respect in their own right. Here it is the interests of the many groups whose existence and 
flourishing are bound up with the island’s natural environment which generate certain 
moral requirements which we can say were violated by the Depletion Policy’s adoption.  
 Suppose that the community was, prior to the sea-level rise, a traditional 
community dedicated to preserving a rich cultural and linguistic heritage. As the warming, 
and consequent sea-level rises, would result in the impoverishment of the islanders’ 
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linguistic and cultural heritage (most of the population bar the Elders, let us suppose, have 
fled to the mainland and now need to speak a different language in order to seek a living) 
the interests of the islanders as a collectivity might be thought to have been harmed by 
this.  Because it assumes that there is inherent value in the survival of certain groups and 
that these groups possess valid moral claims qua groups, the group-centred view appears 
to avoid problems of non-identity. This is because the conditions of existence of many 
future groups (such as states, nations or cultures) will often be robust to the point that they 
will not be affected by environmental policy decisions made in the past. Obviously there 
are a number of simplifying assumptions being made here, such as the assumption that 
many of the adverse impacts of climate change on future populations can be prevented by 
the concerted efforts of present persons, governments and international institutions. 
However, the central idea - that climate change will in certain instances jeopardise the 
survival of certain communities and traditional patterns of life quite apart from the effects 
it will have on the individual members of these cultures - appears to be a plausible one.31
 It is worth comparing the view proposed here with recent contributions to the issue 
of the rights or claims of minority cultures. It has recently been argued that the adoption of 
certain acts or social policies can be wrong by virtue of undermining the needs which 
particular individuals have to access a flourishing cultural or communal context within 
which to pursue their personal life-plans or conceptions of the good. For example, in his 
treatment of the issue of the claims of minority communities, Kymlicka argues that 
‘membership in a cultural structure is what enables individual freedom, what enables 
meaningful choices about how to lead one’s life.’
 
32 Kymlicka goes on to claim that the 
moral importance of individual freedom is such that persons belonging to disadvantaged 
minority cultures should be afforded additional rights and resources to compensate for the 
disadvantages they face as a result of membership in a minority culture. But while these 
rights are collective, in the sense that they are exercised collectively rather than 
individually, they are nonetheless individual rights in the sense that they are grounded in 
the interests of particular persons.33
                                                          
31 The IPCC certainly think so, for they expect that ‘adaptation to sea-level-rise and climate change will 
involve important trade-offs, which could include environmental, social, cultural values’ (p.292). 
 By contrast, according to the group-centred view, the 
32 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), p.208; and 
Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.80ff. 
33  See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp.34ff. 
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communities which future people will belong to are deserving of concern and respect in 
their own right; and if present actions have the result either that these communities die out 
altogether, or are damaged in the sense that various communal practices are undermined, 
they are morally objectionable at least in this one important respect.34
 In this regard, the group-centred view shares much in common with Charles 
Taylor’s work on multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, and in particular on the 
issue of the value of communities. Taylor denies that the worth of communities is derived 
from the value it has in securing the ‘cultural needs’ of individuals, such as their seeking 
to give meaning to their lives. He gives two reasons for this. First, Kymlicka’s 
individualistic view neglects the moral importance of various communities qua 
communities. The idea here is that communities are often not merely associations of 
value-bearing individuals, but rather moral entities in their own right. Secondly, the 
individualistic view cannot make space for the way in which many persons have the 
intense desire that the community, or communities, they belong to continue to survive and 
flourish for reasons unrelated to the positive impact that this will have on their own well-
being, or on the well-being of their compatriots taken as individuals.
  
35 As such, Taylor 
argues that Kymlicka’s individualistic view might be valid perhaps ‘for existing people 
who find themselves trapped within a culture under pressure, and can flourish within it or 
not at all. But it doesn’t justify measures designed to ensure survival through indefinite 
future generations. For the populations concerned, however, that is what is at stake.’36
                                                          
34 The idea of group-centred requirements of intergenerational justice might also be contrasted with the more 
obviously ‘communitarian’ idea that present persons should protect the conditions of communal flourishing 
because the communities which they belong to are in fact essential components of their identity as persons. 
Consider, for example, the communitarian theory of intergenerational justice defended in A. de Shalit’s Why 
Posterity Matters, (London, Routledge, 1996), especially Ch.1. The idea is also to be contrasted with recent 
contributions to the ‘deep ecology’ mode of environmental thought, according to which duties of 
environmental conservation flow from the fact that human identity is not merely moulded by membership in 
human communities, but in addition by it’s connection to natural processes and the biosphere itself. See, for 
example, W. Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, (Boston, Shambala, 1990). By contrast, the key to the 
group-centred view is the idea that adopting social policies which undermine the integrity or viability of 
certain human, or non-human animal, communities is morally regrettable because this fails to afford these 
communities with the respect that they deserve as moral entities, not that they are regrettable in virtue of 
undermining the motivations of self-transcendence entertained by existing human beings. 
 
According to the terminology introduced earlier, and developed in figure 1, it appears that 
35 C. Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in A. Guttman, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 40-41. 
36 Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, p. 41. 
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Taylor is advocating a widely identity-dependent (or group-centred) view to Kymlicka’s 
narrowly identity-dependent (or individualistic) view. 
 One advantage associated with embracing the group-centred view is that, in virtue 
of retaining an identity-dependent structure, it appears readily reconcilable with the views 
of both Barry and Scanlon. Recall that, for Scanlon, an act is wrong only if its 
performance ‘would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of 
behaviour which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement.’37
 However, contractualists do not appear to be committed to the idea that the 
complaints that they view as unanswerable must be restricted to those arising from harms, 
or wrongs, done to particular persons. This is demonstrated by Scanlon’s understanding 
of the scope of contractualism, according to which (1) moral beings must possess a good 
in the sense that ‘that there be a clear sense in which things can be said to go better or 
worse for that being’, and (2) moral beings must ‘constitute a point of view; that is there 
be such a thing as what it is like to be that being.’
 It was argued above that contractualism and the unanswerable complaints 
principle this view of morality endorses, seem problematic in the context of non-identity 
cases such as the Depletion-Conservation choice, as the Depletion People, taken one by 
one, do not appear to have a legitimate complaint against the Depletion Policy’s adoption.  
38
 While I have not the space here to construct a more positive defence for this line of 
thought, it is worth mentioning that many peoples’ moral intuitions certainly point in this 
direction. Consider, for example, the widespread intuition that the deaths of large numbers 
of persons from small indigenous communities (which result in the deaths of these 
communities) are more regrettable from the moral point of view than equivalent numbers 
of deaths of unrelated individuals. In any case, the suggestion is that we ought to think 
 These two conditions must hold, 
Scanlon thinks, for us to be able to hold that the notion of justification can be applied to an 
entity. But while there are certainly differences between the ‘points of view’ of particular 
human beings on the one side, and particular groups of human beings on the other, there 
seems to be no insurmountable barrier in the way of those who wish to argue that there can 
be such a thing as a group point of view, or perspective on things, or that things can go 
better or worse for at least some groups.  
                                                          
37 Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, p. 110. 
38 Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, pp. 113-14. 
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seriously about revising Scanlon’s account of moral reasoning to read that ‘an act is wrong 
only if it affects some particular individual or group in a way that cannot be justified.’ 
 I have space to mention only one problem with using the group-centred view to 
explain how an identity-dependent objection to depletionist policies might be defended in 
the light of considerations of non-identity. Suppose that a course of action which we think 
will harm a certain future group’s interests would also be a necessary condition of that 
group’s existence. In such cases it might be that the approach will be plagued by a new 
group-centred version of the non-identity problem, which we might call the extended non-
identity problem. This new version of the non-identity problem suggests that a 
representative of some community who claims that the interests of their community had 
been harmed by the profligate environmental activities of past generations would 
encounter great problems in defending this view. In such circumstances it seems that the 
group-centred view could not be used to ground an identity-dependent objection to these 
activities; and as a result it would seem that only identity-independent considerations 
would stand in the way of the claim that it would not be wrong for depletionist policies to 
be adopted by existing generations.  
 It is, of course, worth noting that conditions of non-identity will obtain much less 
regularly in the case of groups than in the case of individual persons. This is because the 
identities of many groups and communities are more robust - nations, for example, 
typically outlive their individual members many times over. As a result, the extended non-
identity problem only partly rebuts the group-centred view. The conclusion we should take 
from this, I think, that this view does indeed offer at least some defence of an identity-
dependent environmental, and intergenerational, ethic. 
 
 
